Foreign aid and the governance of international financial organizations: the Brazilian-bloc case in the IMF and the World Bank
The concept of SSC is not widely agreed upon, being used in general to designate a wide set of phenomena concerned with relations between developing countries. For some, SSC alludes to policies of consultation, dialogue and approximation between the countries of the South, as much on the bilateral level as on a multilateral level. However, the term has also been used to describe a more specific modality of SSC -South-South Development Cooperation (SSDC) -referring to the actions made by a government with the intent of promoting economic development in under-developed countries, involving, as well as technical assistance, loans and donations (LEITE, 2012 and MILANI, 2014) .
This study will employ the stricter concept of SSDC, using the terms foreign aid and IDC to refer to the same phenomenon. It is worth noting that the Brazilian government seeks to distance itself from the concept of foreign aid employed by the Development Assistance Committee of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (DAC/OECD) 3 , calling its policy of foreign aid Brazilian Cooperation for International Development (COBRADI). Thus, Brazil rejects the terminology referring to "donor", "aid" and "assistance" 4 , preferring instead the definition given by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), according to which cooperation refers to processes, institutions, accords, designed to promote political, economic, and technical cooperation between developing countries that seek common development and a horizontal relationship.
___________________________________________________________________________
2 According to the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC, Agência Brasileira de Cooperação), 30 projects and/or activities of cooperation were signed in 2004, 66 in 2005, 147 in 2006, 175 in 2007, 263 in 2008, 386 in 2009 and 472 in 2010. 3 Multilateral organization created in September 1961, being an international forum made up of the main bilateral donors. It should be noted that not all members of the OECD are members of the DAC. This difference, besides mere terminology, is accompanied by a diverse methodology related to the accountability of the spending on these policies. For example, contrary to the methodology utilized by the OECD, the forgiveness and renegotiation of debts, and concessionary loans with variable rates of return, do not enter into the balance sheets of the Brazilian government, kept by the Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA, Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada).
However, this study will use a wider concept of foreign assistance, defining this practice as "the voluntary transfer of the public funds of one government to another, with the objective of promoting development in the receiving country" (IPEA, 2013) ; the data from the AidData 3.0 project is used 5 .
Although there is a considerable literature on the determinants of foreign aid and of its efficacy, these studies are centered on the aid provided by developed countries; there is a lack of work on such cooperation delivered by emerging states, and in particular, Brazil. The present work, dialoguing with the studies that sought to analyze the patterns of the supply of traditional foreign aid (ALESINA and DOLLAR, 2000; BEARCE AND TIRONE, 2010; BERMEO, 2008; BERTHÉLEMY, 2006; DREHER, NUNNENKAMP and THIELE, 2008; KUZIEMKO AND WERKER, 2006; MCKINLEY AND LITTLE, 1977) , seeks to investigate the determinants of the allocation of Brazilian foreign aid.
The Brazilian case is interesting for various reasons. Firstly, Brazil is one of a group of countries that have gone from recipients to donors of foreign aid in the international arena over the years 6 . Moreover, in contrast with the other donors of the OECD who presently follow the norms of DAC, the official position of the Brazilian government, under President Lula, was that the IDC undertaken by Brazil does not ___________________________________________________________________________ 5 AidData is the result of a partnership formed in 2009 between three institutions -the College of William and Mary, the Development Gateway and the University of Brigham Young -, which has as its objective to make the available data on foreign aid more transparent and to aggregate information from various sources (AidData, 2011) . It is worth noting that Brazilian aid data in AidData 3.0 do not cover the totality of the cooperation projects agreed to by Brazil during this period. The dataset of IPEA, the agency responsible for the systematization of this information, is not yet available to the general public. IPEA has released only some reports with aggregated values in relation to spending on these public policies in recent years, but has not released amounts for individual projects. 6 According to a data crosscheck by Le Monde Diplomatique Brasil, the Brazilian government, between 2005 and 2009, supplied more international aid than it received from countries and multilateral agencies. It is worth mentioning that Brazil continues to receive foreign aid, this being one of the reasons that the country sought to distance itself from the official IDC terminology used by DAC/OECD. Managing Director, as well as exercising all of the powers delegated by the Board of Governors.
In the IMF, the voting power of each member state is determined by its participation quota, in which each member possesses 250 basic votes plus one more for every 100,000 Special Drawing Rights (SDR). This system of quotas also delineates the contributions of the states in the Fund, the availability of resources, and the distribution of SDRs between the members. The decision process in the IMF is based on the relative voting power of its members, where ordinary decisions need a simple majority to be approved, while some decisions need special majorities specified by the Articles of Agreement 8 .
Of the twenty-four chairs in the Executive Board, only five are occupied by Brazilian bloc, which like the Swiss bloc, is formed of states that do not possess evident ties amongst themselves.
Foreign aid in the international system
The supply of foreign aid is not a recent phenomenon in international relations. Although there is no consensus on its definition, its origins are usually traced to the post-Second World War context, with the creation of the Marshall Plan and the Bretton Woods institutions. Note that the supply of aid was motivated by a combination of political, economic, social, geo-strategic, ideological, moral and ethical factors, and the weight of importance of each of these elements has varied over time (LANCASTER, 2007 and PUENTE, 2010) .
In tandem with the development of IDC in the international arena, a family of literatures has sought to analyze the determinants of North-South Cooperation, identifying how these countries utilize foreign aid in order to realize their foreign policy objectives. One of the seminal works in this area is the study by McKinley and Little (1977) on the determinants of foreign aid provided by the USA, which structured the discussion around two alternative models to explain the allocation of foreign aid: the model of recipient needs and the model of donor interests. In the first model, the quantity of foreign aid supplied to each low-income country is thought to be proportional to the economic and social needs of these countries, such that the indicators that refer to foreign aid vary together with socioeconomic indicators for the recipients. In the second, the hypothesis is that the quantity of foreign aid received by whatever low-income country is thought to be proportional to the level of interest of the donor in the recipient country, with the interests of the donor being categorized in terms of political and economic interests.
Although these authors have structured the debate around two alternative models, it is clear that, to the extent that there is a series of important variables for explaining the supply of foreign aid, it is necessary to introduce them into the same model to avoid problems of omitted variable bias. Thus, a generation of studies has sought to analyze this phenomenon by using so-called 'hybrid' models, that is, combining the variables relating to donor motivations and donor interests in t he same model. Berthélemy (2006) studied the distribution of foreign aid supplied by various donor states over the decades of the 80s and 90s and his results show that the majority of the donors behave in a selfish manner as regards the supply of foreign aid, to the extent that not only do these countries utilize these policies in order to strengthen political connections with the recipients, but also to direct the aid toward their most significant commercial partners. Nonetheless, the results demonstrate that donors too take into consideration some of the needs and merits of the recipient countries, favoring on average the countries with the best governance and democracy indicators and those that have the largest growth rates.
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Brazilian foreign aid
Although this study adopts as its scope foreign aid supplied by Brazil in the period following 2003, encompassing the two Lula governments, it is worth highlighting the fact that IDC is not a creation of these administrations. Brazil has not been on the margins of global movements in relation to IDC, moving from recipient to donor during recent decades. However, it is from the time of the first government of Lula that SSDC gained prominence, being perceived with greater clarity as an instrument of Brazilian foreign policy, and being used as such. From 2003 onwards, the strategy of the integration of the country through the promotion of alliances and agreements with partners of the South, in order to reduce the asymmetries in relations with developed countries and increase Brazilian negotiating capacity, was strengthened (HIRST, LIMA and PINHEIRO, 2010; OLIVEIRA and ONUKI, 2012; PINHEIRO and GAIO, 2014; VIGEVANI and CEPALUNI, 2007) . Faria and Paradis (2013) claim that the "solidarity" character of the international integration strategy adopted by Brazil after Lula's arrival into power, A n g o l a A l g e r i a S e n e g a l P a r a g u a y U r u g u a y C u b a B o l i v i a B e n i n G h a n a P e r u A r g e n t i n a C o s t a R i c a K e n y a P a n a m a 0 20 40 60 80
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B u s i n e s s a n d o t h e r s e r v i c e s E n v i r o n m e n t a l p r o t e c t i o n W a t e r s u p p l y a n d s a n i t a t i o n S e c u r i t y T r a d e p o l i c y a n d r e g u l a t i o n s M i n e r a l r e s o u r c e s a n d m i n i n g E n e r g y g e n e r a t i o n a n d s u p p l y T o u r i s m B a n k i n g a n d f i n a n c i a l s e r v i c e s D i s a s t e r p r e v e n t i o n a n d p r e p a r e d n e s s F o o d s e c u r i t y a s s i s t a n c e R e c o n s t r u c t i o n r e l i e f T r a n s p o r t a n d s t o r a g e G e n e r a l b u d g e t s u p p o r t (BECK and KATZ, 1995) . Due to the "membro" variable displaying little variation in the period analyzed, being practically the same countries in the Brazilian coalition between 2003 and 2010, and due to the fact that the models estimated in the cross-sectional dataset displayed better measures of fit, only the latter models were chosen for this article, with the others presented in the appendices, available on BPSR website at bpsr.org.br/files/archives/Dataset_Apolinario. The results over the two models are also similar, with the difference being that in the models estimated from panel data, the "member" variable loses statistical significance with the inclusion of regional dummies for continents. Note that Brazil only came to provide foreign aid in a systematic fashion in the last decade, while the majority of the countries that compose the Brazilian bloc have participated in it for a longer time. The idea is that participation in the Brazilian coalition is one of the determinants for receipt of foreign aid, such that the countries that make up the Brazilian bloc in international financial institutions are compensated from the moment that Brazil came to provide aid in the international arena in order to keep these countries inside its sphere of influence in these organizations.
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Although this research dialogues with the analysis by Vreeland (2011) on the Swiss case, it should be noted that the cases and theoretical models are different. Even if, on the one hand, Switzerland has been providing foreign aid for decades, its coalition was formed only at the start of the 1990s. Yet the Brazilian case is the inverse, inasmuch as its coalition exists since the founding of these institutions, passing through few changes, whereas Brazil only came to provide aid in a substantial way during the second Lula government.
In order to test the formulated hypothesis, regressions were run, using the Ordinary Least Squares method for data distributed in cross sectional format, where the dependent variable refers to Brazilian foreign aid. In order to operationalize this variable, the natural logarithm of the total for foreign aid provided by Brazil was used, for each country in the sample during the considered ___________________________________________________________________________ 19 The natural logarithm of the variable was used to make the distribution of the variable approximate a normal distribution. Due to the fact it is impossible to take the log of "0", firstly, the "1"s referring to foreign aid were summed and the log was subsequently taken. The information above gives an idea of the general panorama of Brazilian foreign aid. Although it is merely a descriptive analysis, these data point to the importance of controlling for the effect of these variables in the estimation of econometric models, insofar as they reveal indices of the relation between the supply of Brazilian foreign aid and each one of these dichotomous variables, including the variable of interest in this study, "member". Hence, it is expected that these variables will have positive coefficients in relation to the dependent variable,
Brazilian bilateral foreign aid, in the regression analysis.
Empirical analysis
Regressions were run for the dependent variable referring to foreign aid, in by Brazil, with the exception of dichotomous regional variables. Finally, the sixth model considers, besides the "member" variable, all the controls used in the preceding models. Table 03 displays the results of the models estimated. level. Yet, in the sixth model, the "member" variable has a coefficient of 2.64 and is statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
Substantively, because we are dealing with a log-level relation, in which the dependent variable is operationalized by means of the natural logarithm of the original values, the estimated impact of the coefficients should be read as 100 times the estimate of the parameter (beta) % in relation to the dependent variable (GUJARATI, 2006) . Thus, the impact of the "member" variable on the volume of foreign aid given by Brazil, compared to a non-member country, increases by 584% the volume of Brazilian foreign aid in model 5 and by 261% in model 06, given that the other factors are held constant.
Considering a 95% confidence interval, this value varies between 412% and 756% in the fifth model and between 43% and 477% in model 06.
Regarding the control variables taken from the guidelines for the provision of Brazilian foreign aid, it is worth noting the importance of African, South American, Central American and CPLP countries for the Brazilian foreign policy. The variables "africa", "amsul" and "amcentral" show positive coefficients of a high magnitude (7.83, 9.62 and 10.39, respectively) and these are statistically significant at the 0.001 level, evidence for the importance of regional factors in the realization of cooperation agreements with Brazil. In relation to the variables from the international literature on foreign aid, although the three variables do not display statistical significance in the final model, which considers regional factors, these variables are statistically significant in the preceding models. In models 04 and 05, "ln_percapita" is statistically at the 0.001, with a negative coefficient, indicating that the more developed a country, the less foreign aid it receives from the Brazilian government. The "ln_pop" variable shows statistical significance at the 0.001 and 0.01 levels, with negative coefficients, showing that the larger a country, the less foreign aid it receives from Brazil. Lastly, the "ln_comercio" variable is positively signed and achieves statistical significance at the 0.01 and 0.001 levels, signifying that the greater the commercial relationship with Brazil during the period considered, the more Brazilian foreign aid the country receives, suggesting that there are commercial motivations in the provision of foreign aid on Brazil's part.
In the two cases, as we are dealing with log-log relations, the impact estimated by the coefficients should be read as the variation of 01% in the independent variable leads to a variation of (beta) % in the dependent variable (GUJARATI, 2006) . Therefore, in the fifth model, the increase of 01% in the per capita income of a country lessens the Brazilian foreign aid it receives by 2.39%; an increase of 01% in trade increases the aid received by 0.85%, other factors held constant. For the inferential analysis, this research employed the data available until the present moment on Brazilian foreign aid. It is worth noting that the data on Brazilian foreign aid taken from the AidData 3.0 project are still incomplete and that the datasets from IPEA are still unavailable to the general public. In the future, it would be interesting to undertake analysis utilizing the official data supplied by the government to see if the results differ.
Conclusion
This exploratory research has sought to dialogue with the literatures on foreign aid and on the governance of international financial institutions. There are various avenues for future research in both areas. Firstly, in relation to the literature that deals with the role of emerging states in the governance of the IMF and the World Bank, although it has been shown that these countries are compensated financially for supporting Brazil in these organizations, the reasons for support before the country became a donor in the international arena have not been determined. In a future research agenda, it would be interesting to carry out interviews with staff who have served in these institutions in order to list the initial motives for the formation of the Brazilian bloc and for its continuity and change.
In relation to a research agenda on the foreign aid provided by emerging countries, this study has sought to investigate the determinants for receiving Brazilian aid. Going beyond descriptive analysis, a determinant until now little explored was presented. This study showed that the Brazilian government aimed for diplomatic objectives with its foreign aid policy, in this case, the expansion of its influence in the governance of the IMF and the World Bank. A hypothesis to be tested in the future is if this fact was due to competition arising from the increase in participation quotas of other emerging countries in these organizations. 
